Despite their defeat in World War I, the German officer corps in the interwar period still saw the main means of victory in a future war in an offensive operation. Thus, he drew a different experience from the Great War than his French counterpart. Based on the experience of 1914-1918, including the infiltration tactics used by the Stosstruppen troops, but also noticing the intense development of aviation and armored weapons, part of the German officer corps (e.g. Gen. Heinz Guderian) developed theoretical assumptions of the so-called lightning war (German: Blitzkrieg), that is, striving to knock down the enemy with one decisive offensive operation carried out in the shortest possible time and with the maximum intensity of forces and resources. The German officer corps was also trained according to this offensive doctrine of war in the 1930s and during the world war. It is also worth adding that German officers of almost all levels in the course of World War II used the principle of the so-called command by task (Ger. Auftragstaktik), that is, they outlined to their subordinates the task to be achieved and the forces at their disposal, while the execution of the task was entirely up to them. Such a model of command, based on very well and uniformly trained officers, led to the fact that the German army was highly flexible in action and was able to react faster to various levels than its opponents (e.g. the French army during the campaign of 1940 or Soviet army of 1941). This system proved successful (especially at lower levels) throughout World War II. It is also worth adding that many outstanding commanders served in the German officer corps from the Second World War, including: Erich von Manstein, Heinz Guderian, Erwin Rommel and Walter Model.
The first tanks in the German army appeared at the end of World War I - these were the A7V machines. After the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, the German armed forces were forbidden to develop armored weapons, but the German side did not honor these restrictions and secretly developed armored weapons. However, after Adolf Hitler came to power in 1933, this development became fully official, and in 1935 the 1st Armored Division was formed. In the period 1935-1939, further divisions were formed, and their main equipment was the Pz.Kpfw cars: I, II, III and IV. A single armored division at that time was composed of a tank brigade divided into two armored regiments, a motorized infantry brigade and support units, among others: reconnaissance, artillery, anti-aircraft and sappers. It consisted of about 300 tanks in full time. It is also worth adding that the German armored forces (German: Panzerwaffe) were trained and prepared to implement the doctrine of lightning war, and not - as in many armies of the time - to support infantry activities. Therefore, emphasis was put in training "pancerniaków" on the interchangeability of functions, independence in decision-making by officers and non-commissioned officers and the best technical mastery of the tanks owned. All this resulted in great successes of German armored weapons in Poland in 1939, but especially in Western Europe in 1940. Also in the course of the fighting in North Africa - especially in the period 1941-1942 - the German armored forces turned out to be a very difficult opponent. Before the invasion of the USSR, the number of German armored divisions almost doubled, but the number of tanks in these units decreased to about 150-200 vehicles. Also in the course of the fighting on the Eastern Front - especially in 1941-1942 - the German armored forces were superior in training and organization to their Soviet opponent. However, contact with such vehicles as the T-34 or KW-1 forced the introduction of the Pz.Kpfw V and VI tanks to the line in 1942 and 1943. Growing losses on the Eastern Front, as well as lost battles - at Stalingrad or Kursk - made the German Panzerwaffe weaken. Its structure included heavy tank battalions (with 3 tank companies), and in 1943, armored grenadier divisions were established. There was also an increasingly clear advantage of the Soviet side, and from 1944 - the need to simultaneously fight the Soviet troops in the east and the Allies in the west. It is also assumed that it was then (in the years 1944-1945) that the training of the German armored forces was weaker than in the previous period and did not constitute such a significant advantage on the German side than before. The last large-scale operations of the German Panzerwaffe were the offensives in the Ardennes (1944-1945) and in Hungary (1945).